Who should replace Shinseki at the VA, and the need for other reforms.

I’d love to see retired Marine General Jim Mattis take charge of the VA. I think a good part of Shinseki’s failure was that he set metrics, but failed to supervise to ensure that they were really being met. I suspect Mattis wouldn’t fall quite so easily for such a snow job from underlings.

But I’m not adamant that the head of the VA needs to be a retired general or flag officer. I’m not even sure that’s the best pool to choose from. As others have noted, one guy with great talent at turning around failing organizations is… Mitt Romney. I’d greatly prefer the head of the VA be a veteran, and more importantly, I’d really like to see someone with experience in medical administration. But I’m surely open to your suggestions.

But simply finding the “right guy” to lead the VA is simply not enough. As Jillian Kay Melchior shows us, there are literally hundreds of people at the VA, paid by the taxpayer, to perform union work full time, or part time.

In 2012, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs paid at least $11.4 million to 174 nurses, mental-health specialists, therapists, and other health-care professionals who, instead of caring for veterans, worked full-time doing union business.


In total, the VA spent at least $13.77 million on 251 salaried employees performing full-time union work. Others, who were not included on the list provided by the VA, work part-time for unions at the taxpayer expense. In fiscal year 2011, the latest on record, the VA used 998,483 hours of this “official time,” costing taxpayers more than $42 million.

The concept of unionized federal workers is repugnant enough. That those same unions are then supported at the expense of taxpayers is vile. And that civil servants, hired for their skills and qualifications as health care providers, then spend their time on union business is simply revolting.

And it isn’t simply the union employees that are problematic. Even had Eric Shinseki known his subordinates throughout the VA were systematically cooking the books, or otherwise failing to put forth their best effort to provide the very services they were hired to provide, he couldn’t have fired them, except in the most extraordinary circumstances.

Not just in the VA, but throughout the entire government, the civil service is in desperate need of overhaul.  The elimination of the spoils system to the civil service system of today has produced a fourth branch of government, a self serving bureaucracy that, while generally aligned with the Democratic party of big government, seeks above all else to further its own interests.

It used to be that one worked for the government with the understanding that pay would be lower, in exchange for greater job security. This has metastasized to the point that the government employee’s pay is typically a third greater than the private sector, and virtually no crime short of murder will lead to dismissal.

We’ve certainly strayed from Lincoln’s ideal of government of, by, and for the people. And unless and until we address that, whoever replaces Shinseki at the VA will be faced with an impossible task. 

Happy 238th Birthday to the United States Marine Corps


The Marine Corps first recruits joined at Tun Tavern, Philadelphia on November 10, 1775. The first recruit found himself before

the bar manager, Robert Mullan. He signed the enlistment, and was instructed to go into Tun Alley and await further orders.
A few minutes pass, when another young enlistee joins him. Sitting on the curb, the second fellow asks the first, “So, what kind of chickenshit outfit do you think this is gonna be?”

Says the first Marine, “Boot, let me tell you how it was in the Old Corps…”

Paralysis by Analysis

Robert Kozlowski, writing at the US Naval Institute’s USNIBlog has a good post that shows a startling graphic.


Open the graphic in a new tab to see the whole thing.

I’m curious what happened to the acquisition process in 1975 that lead to such a sharp increase in the time needed to field a weapon system.

But the key thing is, time is money. Lots and lots of money. Now, you’ll say, XBrad, the items like the B-2 and the F-22 are pretty cutting edge technology. And so they are. But so were things like the B-58, and the F-111. Notice also, the F-117, a cutting edge technology, had minimal oversight, and yet it reached IOC well below the trendline.

I’d expect to see some increase in the trendline of development times. But I’d expect to see something more like that commercial aircraft timeline, or even a little steeper. But clearly, something in the process of acquisition has changed. And Kozlowski argues that it is the intense oversight. I’m agree. And I’ll note that the purpose of the oversight was to ensure money spent was well spent. Oddly, the oversight, both within DoD and from outside, be it the GAO or Congress or whomever, has stretched the timelines to untenable lengths. We’ve already seen programs such as the RAH-66 Comanche that ran so long in development that they were obsolete before they were even ordered into production.  And I’d argue that the drawn out development and oversight costs more than simply mismanaging programs in the first place would have.