The Lessons of the Russo-Ukraine War

A tipster sent this roundup of lessons from the ongoing slow motion Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

It appears that a page or two is missing from near the end (and it badly needs a copy editor) but provides a good deal of insight into Putin’s army’s tactics, it’s operations, and its strategy. Sadly, it also exposes a good deal of the fecklessness of the US in supporting allies and partner nations in Eastern Europe.

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It goes without saying that the Obama administration has done little to nothing to assauge our allies fears of an expansionist Russia. But it must also be noted that there is little public support for a harder line with Russia. Wearied by a decade and a half of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a seemingly ever increasing number of other hot spots, the US public isn’t eager to face off with Russia, seeing little to gain, and the potential for much to lose.

5 thoughts on “The Lessons of the Russo-Ukraine War”

  1. I’m designing a game called “Putin’s War” for my modern history class. How would one find the names and sizes of units used by Russia and the Ukraine?

    1. That’s part of the problem, finding accurate order of battle information on the Russian units. Since “nope, no Russians here!” is the fig leaf Russia is operating under.

  2. Very interesting reading, thanks! Hopefully somebody in the Baltics and Poland has placed orders for a whole bunch of TOW IIs and some Q-36s.

    1. Well, those Q-36 explosive space modulators are pretty handy things to have around, so long as you can set them off from outside the effective range of the Earth-shattering kaboom. NASA budgets being what they are today, however … that’s a bit of a difficult proposition.

  3. Sorry, by Q-36 I meant:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AN/TPQ-36_Firefinder_radar
    (radar for directing counterbattery artillery fire)
    And not:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marvin_the_Martian

    It’s buried in the meat of the article but it appears that lack of effective counterbattery fire is hurting the Ukrainians. That, and lack of antitank missiles that can defeat reactive armor.

    Brings up another point actually- reactive armor forces the tanks and dismounted infantry to operate separately (although it also appears both sides are doing that anyway due to the vulnerability of the BMPs) So, dismounted enemies can probably get much closer, assuming they have anything that can defeat the reactive armor.

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