The Brigade Cavalry Squadron

Long ago, in the mists of time, back before the Army reorganized around the Brigade Combat Team concept, the Army was organized primarily around the Division as the primary tactical unit of deployment and employment. Each division had 9 or 10 maneuver battalions (either Infantry or Armor) organized into three Brigades.

Each Infantry or Armor battalion had a Scout Platoon, designed to provide reconnaissance, or what today would be called RSTA, for Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition.

The Division also had a Cavalry Squadron, essentially an RSTA battalion, with two ground troops and two aviation troops.

Most of the Army division was organized along a fairly triangular scheme, with headquarters at each level controlling three maneuver units, and appropriate supporting elements. One glaring omission in this bygone era was the gap between battalion and division. The Brigades had no organic RSTA assets. You would expect to see a company/troop sized RSTA element at the Brigade level. Instead, there was none. The Division Commander might task his Cav squadron to focus support to one or two of the three Brigades, but usually he needed it to focus on his own RSTA priorities.

So when the Army reorganized and shifted the focus from the Division to the Brigade Combat Team (BCT), one thing they did was assign a very robust RSTA capability. Each maneuver battalion would keep its organic Scout Platoon, and the BCT would have an entire RSTA squadron (or battalion sized element, if you will).

Unfortunately, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan called for increasing the numbers of BCTs in the Army. And while there was some increase in the allowed end-strength of the Army, it wasn’t nearly enough to provide the manpower for all the new BCTs.

So the Army cheated. It would stand up new BCTs, each with, among other things, their own RSTA battalion (which carried the unit designations of various historical Cavalry Squadrons). But instead of each BCT having three regular maneuver battalions, they would only have two. So the prime maneuver combat power of the BCT was reduced by a third. What wasn’t reduced was the missions these BCTs were required to perform. And so, as Tripp Callaway tells us in his article, the Cavalry RSTAs in Iraq and Afghanistan were often pressed into duty as a third maneuver battalion.

This meant that, in effect, most RSTAs were usually utilized as miniature infantry battalions and were thus given corresponding direct combat and COIN tasks to perform, rather than the traditional reconnaissance and flank security tasks they were designed to accomplish.

In the COIN warfare of the War on Terror, that was an acceptable choice.

But should the Army find itself in battle with a more conventional foe, it is imperative that the RSTA should be used in its designed, traditional role.

The Army has a relatively small number of BCTs. And those BCTs are actually fairly fragile, though they have a great deal of combat power. The trick is finding exactly where and when to apply that power, and denying any enemy the opportunity to apply his combat power against us. Finding the enemy, his order of battle, his dispositions and his intentions  while denying the enemy information about our forces and dispositions is the traditional Cavalry mission.

But what about UAVs, you ask? As Callaway notes, in any conflict against a more conventional foe, UAVs will be vulnerable, both to direct measures like Air Defense, and to jamming or cyber attacks such as network intrusions. And for true, persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, there’s no substituting the man on the ground. UAVs complement, not replace, a traditional approach to ISR.

As Callaway makes the central thesis of his piece, the use of RSTA units as conventional units has meant that their traditional Cavalry skills have atrophied. Just as bad, the “end user” of their product has also forgotten how to ask for or use their “product.”

Our austere budget environment has lead to a drawdown of the number of BCTs the Army will have. But it is not all darkness. One effect of the drawdown is that the remaining BCTs will receive a third maneuver battalion. This will (hopefully) free up the RSTA to return to their traditional role.

1 thought on “The Brigade Cavalry Squadron”

  1. While not reading the article (I am supposed to be packing to go shoot gunnery…), your summary is largely correct. I would add that briefly there was the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop (BRT) at the BDE level from about 2000 until the advent of modular BCTs. The BRTs were started because the army recognized that we were operating as separate brigades in places like Bosnia and Kosovo, so they gave that echelon a recon element, so they could stop over-tasking recon objectives to the battalion scout platoons. They were all truck-mounted, two-platoon recce troops. HMMWVs have little staying power, and not a lot of speed, so they had to push out very early to not be rapidly overrun or outgunned. With the BCTs, they formed a recon squadron in every BCT. The army has renamed all recon squadrons as “Cavalry Squadrons” as opposed to formerly differentiating between Armored Reconnaissance Squadrons (heavy) and RSTA Squadrons (light/Stryker). They all have an organization of three troops with two scout platoons in each. Having been with an ARS in Iraq in 07-08, I can tell you that we were seriously limited in combat power, yet expected to hold a maneuver BN’s worth of terrain. The scout platoons were 3 Brad and 5 HMMWV, and 30 Soldiers, so we had to park most of them to get enough dismounts out on the ground. And I agree that the loss of traditional scout skills has been a serious drain. The 19D MOS has taken a big hit at the NCO level due to the too-rapid expansion of cavalry squadrons; for example, my former unit was formed by reorganizing the divisional air defense artillery battalion and bringing in some 19 series and reclassifying the remainder from 14 series.

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