Decisive Action Training

DAT, Decisive Action Training, is the Army’s new moniker for a non-COIN, full spectrum warfare scenario where our units engage near-peer, professional, well equipped forces, to include mechanized forces. The “full spectrum” part means that even while engaging these capable enemy forces, our friendly forces is concurrently expected to perform the full range of missions such as stability and security operations, and provide training and support to host nation forces.

For the past decade, the needs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have dictated that the Army’s Combat Training Centers (CTCs)  have focused almost exclusively on training brigade combat teams for COIN operations, usually as a capstone exercise during a training rotation just before deployment. But with the end of operations in Iraq, and with the end of the surge of forces to Afghanistan, the CTCs have begun to shift back toward a more “force on force” regimen.

As Tom Ricks of Foreign Policy’s Best Defense blog tells us, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment * recently went through one of these first DATs. Tom is more than a little concerned that a lot of the basic warfighting skills of brigades have eroded. He links to the following report as evidence of this failure of units to train to a sufficient level:

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If you read just Tom’s article, and the above report, you’ll get the impression that 2CR can’t find their asses with both hands and a map GPS. Personally, without having seen either the complete After Action Review package, nor having actually seen 2CR operate, I can make some fairly educated guesses as to what the ground truth is here.

First, I’m certain 2CR did have any number of major shortcomings in its training rotation at Hoehenfels. That’s kind of the whole point of training. Rotations at CTCs are explicitly designed to stress the entire unit, particularly the command and control elements of a brigade combat team. Some units do well at rotations, and some do poorly, but none do a rotation perfectly. There are always things a unit can do to improve. Secondly, as much as the rotation is for training the brigade in the rotation, it is also a key tool for helping Big Army identify those trends that it needs to focus on across the entire force.

For instance, the report above spends a good deal of time identifying shortcomings in 2CRs approach to Mission Command, the Army’s current doctrine for how leaders command missions. Ideally, through MC, a commander identifies those tasks that he needs his subordinate commanders to accomplish in order to accomplish his own mission. He then tasks his subordinates to do those missions within  broad guidelines, leaving the details of exactly how to do it to them. This frees the commander to focus more on the big picture, and spend his time synchronizing operations, and better able to control the overall operation. But sadly, far too often, commanders, while following the party line on MC, fail to actually implement the philosophy. The report claims MC is something of a radical departure from previous command and control doctrine, but this is a tad misleading. In fact, almost since the end of World War II, the Army has touted some form of Mission Command, under various names, as the correct approach. As always, the problem has been that many commanders at all levels are often loathe to truly allow junior leaders the authority and autonomy to plan and conduct their own operations. Proper implementation of MC is a delicate balance of granting autonomy, while still ensuring that subordinate command operations are truly oriented to supporting the overall mission and synchronized in time and space with the higher command. All the networking and battle management tools available don’t magically provide this balance. That’s why today’s doctrine correctly notes that while “control” is a science, “command” is an art.

Ironically, the report identifies units operating in a COIN environment being under closer micromanagement than under a Decisive Action environment. But in truth, given the huge geographical areas a unit might operate in during COIN, sub-units often have far more autonomy. Decisive Action against a near-peer mechanized force calls for a far more concentrated friendly force, and commanders tend to exercise far more close control over the immediate actions of subordinate units. As an example, during Desert Storm, my brigade issued its order, the subordinate battalions issued their own orders, then each company issued its order, just as they are supposed to. But during the actual operation, the entire brigade moved as a single formation, with almost every combat vehicle being within visual range of the commander at all times. The subordinate commanders were, in effect, little more than guides for the rest of the vehicles.

There are some troubling aspects to the report. The basic field skills of the troops surely need some work. On the other hand, that’s a pretty easy skill set to teach, compared to some other tasks ahead of 2CR. Relearning to integrate the full capabilities of supporting fires will take a bit more effort. Without actually going out and shooting a lot of very expensive stuff, on very scarce ranges, it’s hard to truly learn that art.

Finally, while not excusing any shortcomings that 2CR may have, allow me to offer some reasons why they may not have performed as well as might be hoped.

Imagine the Crimson Tide of Alabama. Take the entire defensive roster, one of the better lineups around. Work them hard, all season long, game after game. Then suddenly tell them they’ll be graded, not on how well they perform on game day, but on how well they perform on a practice scrimmage. Against an NFL team. And oh, yeah, instead of playing defense, you’ll be playing the offense.  And for good measure, you still have to go out next weekend, and play a real game. As defense.

You see, 2CR has been focused on COIN for a long time. As was right and proper. And not only that, they have a deployment to Afghanistan scheduled, in which they will be, again, performing COIN operations. Just how focused were they on performing DAT?  I’d wager there were some folks in the chain of command that felt DAT was a distraction rather than a real training opportunity.

After a decade in which virtually every Brigade Combat Team in the Army has deployed and fought in a COIN environment, a decade where the Army had to relearn small war operations often at great pain, it is time for the Army to return its focus to more traditional warfighting capabilities. But to think that is a skillset units will instantly master is unrealistic. It’s going to take time, effort, sweat and more than a few hurt feelings to return to the level of competency that units need to establish.

*In spite of its name and having squadrons and troops rather than battalions and companies, 2nd Cavalry Regiment is in fact just another Stryker Brigade Combat Team.

4 thoughts on “Decisive Action Training”

  1. This is a bigger issue than most commanders will admit. I am a 1SG for an HHT and I can tell you, we’re swamped at the NCO level. When your tasked with 100 tasks and only have time for 25, but your still expected to accomplish all 100, well, shit gets half assed and we all know it. My BDE, 2-4 ABCT, just finished a BDE VALEX on individual skills. It briefs well that all Soldiers went and had their individual skills validated, but in reality, it was BS. The NCOs were not given the time to train the individual skills. During the VALEX, most Soldiers were recieving the training instead of actually being evaluated on something they should have been trained on. imagine, 1 hour of NBC training and we’re “validated” on individual NBC tasks. Can’t wait to see how thats going to work out if we ever get slimed in combat someday. Will we have time later to make up for training, nope, that box is checked and we’ve moved on, the entire Army is like that right now. The big Army needs to take a breath and relax a bit. If a unit is in reset phase after deployment, and it is also tasked with DIV and BDE red, they arn’t doing any training and should not be expected by higher up to get any done. Now good NCOs will train the few that they have around, but usually, you have 4 dudes from 3 differnt platoons and it gets kinda pointless.

  2. Read that and sent it on to my guys a couple days ago. No surprises in it. I am going to NTC in JAN having spent very little time training for it. Many of my guys still have no idea how to live in a field environment. We have done some higher level maneuver but almost no synchronization of anything. And the individual skills are non-existent. At least I didn’t have to claim we validated them. We will all die if chem strike occurs. In FEB, someone will write the same assessment of us. And it will all be true. And there is nothing we can do about it but go out and train some more until we re-learn it all. Mission command involves detailed command still because in most cases, the seniors are the only ones who still remember how to do it.

    1. We’ll see. My regular camera died on the shores West Beach when HH6 took pictures of the dog. I recently tried to take some video during Table IX (Section gunnery, I shot with my S4) and it all turned out like crap. I took video during a CALFEX and for some reason the sound is gone. Track record is poor. And my driver will be buttoned up most of the time!
      In case you aren’t aware, the enemy at NTC is now the “Donovians” who are doing some aggressive cross-border incursions into “Atropia” to regain land lost back in 1983 or so. The DATE is loosely based on the GAAT (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey) scenario trained at CGSC the SMA, but with different names. Come up to “embed” with the BN. I have no idea how that works, but it could be interesting.

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