Marines Will Depend on Army, Allies, Private Sector To Get Ashore

Going back to the future ain’t easy. After a decade largely spent waging land wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. Marine Corps wants to reemphasize large-scale amphibious operations, like its recent “Bold Alligator” exercise. But to do that in the face of rising threats, shrinking budgets, and limited assets, they’re going to have to rely not only on their traditional partners in the U.S. Navy but increasingly on the Army, friendly nations, and even the commercial sector for logistical support to get them ashore.

via Marines Will Depend on Army, Allies, Private Sector To Get Ashore.

Meh. Nothing new here. While the Marines are right to return their focus to “kicking in the door” style forced entry, the fact is, large scale amphibious operations have always required significant logistical support from the other services, including the Army, and follow-on logistics have always relied on allied and civilian shipping and other transportation assets.

12 thoughts on “Marines Will Depend on Army, Allies, Private Sector To Get Ashore”

  1. Brad, you got this exactly right. Part of the dichotomy is what we perceive as “large-scale” amphibious operations. Even Bold Alligator is rather minor in comparison to truly large scale amphibious operations. The forcible entry part of projecting power ashore will likely be a force smaller than ten thousand, with follow-on forces transitioning ashore to expand the foothold or attack objectives farther ashore.

    My Dad made eleven amphibious landings in the South Pacific during World War II. I asked him once about going ashore at Hollandia and Tanamerah Bay, and he said that this was a comparatively small landing. Just about 80,000 men landed from about 150 ships. This, a secondary objective of a secondary axis of a secondary theater. Small.

  2. Yep. Almost three years in theater. Eleven landings, five battle stars on his Asiatic-Pacific theater ribbon.

    Left the Navy in 46 as a MM2 at age 20. Five ribbons. PUC with a star, Good Cookie, American Campaign, Asiatic-Pacific, and a Victory Medal.

    We had people coming home from sitting in Saudi Arabia for a month in 1991 who rated six. Makes you wonder, dunnit?

    1. Hmmm. 5 months in Desert Shield/Storm…

      CIB, ArCom, AAM, SWASM, NDSM, Liberation of Kuwait (SA) and Liberation of Kuwait (K).

      Had I been a SSG or above, the ArCom would have been a BSM(M).

  3. About par for the course. You got me thinking; of your above awards, only one was awarded for your personal actions, that being the AAM. Everything else lumps into “I was there.”
    I just checked my ORB, and totaled up my stuff. Considering service from 1986 until now, I have accrued 36 “things” (including multiple awards, unit awards, etc.) Of those 36, 28 were essentially “I deployed, I was in Germany, I went to school, I PCS’d”, etc while only five are of a “you done good” nature, i.e. personal accomplishments. The remainding three are badges. Suddenly I feel like a dud!

    1. ALL my awards were “gimmes”

      The AAM was de facto automatic. And all my “impact” AAMs were pretty much the same thing. At the end of a training evolution, the platoon would be told “submit two soldiers for AAM” and of course, we would. More than once, after the PSG told me I was going to get one, he’d immediately task me with writing the damn thing as well. Which, at least my name got spelled right!

  4. When I was in it was the NDSM that everyone got. I think they stopped it just after my youngest brother went in. We called it the geedunk medal. I also called it the “I was dumb enough to join” medal.

    1. Some of us called the NDSM the “me too” ribbon.

      As in: “You watched Desert Storm on TV? Me too!”

    2. Oddly enough, I *did* watch Desert Storm on TV. After the fact. On Esli’s TV, no less. He had tapes of CNN and whatnot, and I got to see a bit more than could be spied from the periscopes in the back of a Bradley.

      CIB= “Carried In Back/ Carried In a Bradley”

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