The Lessons of TF Smith « Neptunus Lex

Several times on this blog, I’ve noted my fervent belief that it is easier and wiser to have a high intensity conflict capable army that is not optimized for COIN than it is to have a COIN army suddenly tasked to perform against a peer competitor.

Seems I’m not the only thinking this way.


The Lessons of TF Smith « Neptunus Lex.

4 thoughts on “The Lessons of TF Smith « Neptunus Lex”

  1. Well, I would say this about that. There is a grat amount of validity to saying that we can’t just train for the current fight, that we need to saty realy to face other threats…but…and it’s a big BUT…the problem I see, especially within my field of expertise (Army aviation) is dwell time. If you have as my current Brigade does, a 13 month dwell time what are you going to train to do? A fight that you know is coming, that you will have to execute in less than a year? Or do you train something you might have to face sometime in the future? In a perfect world you would do both. But we aren’t in that world and we have a limited time to train, so if one makes a list of all the things we would like to do and balance those things against the time available…guess what falls off the list first?

    I’m not saying that is the way things should be, but that’s reality and there’s nothing you can do about it right now unless you lengthen dwell time or just stop fighting the war that we are in.

  2. [REDACTED!] Outlaw, *Are you crazy?!?!* Do you realize that you, are even hinting at the concept of The US Government, would *ever consider the idea of the possibility of using, “Common Sense?” If they ever did that, it would throw everybody out of step and take us for ever to get our cadence right!

    My father taught me, that the US Government wanted a perfectly square building. The end result was the Pentagon.

    Outlaw, take care and I hope you have a healthy Happy New Year!

    ; – )

  3. Dwell time is definitely a consideration. The army expects us to be proficient in Offense, Defense and Stability Operations (and Civil Support). The type of offfense/defense we train for is based on our next deployment. Nobody is anticipating a Major Combat Operation (MCO) any time soon, so the army is taking huge risk right now and focusing on the light end of the spectrum. (My personal opinion is that we have pretty much lost the MCO skill sets in any rank below majors and 1SGts. As brigades (particularly heavy brigades) fall out of the rotation schedule, they are turning up in a contingency expeditionary force pool where they will be expected to work on MCO skills. The National Training Center is adding that into their rotations now, to regain the skills and mindset. But, the bottom line is that a brigade commander is (and better be) training for the war he is going to fight, and there is only enough time available to train for one or the other.

  4. With the Optempo we are suffering from now, combined with the size of the force, training for an MCO is nearly impossible. Many of were against going into Iraq, and I think that has basically proven wise. AFG was a different thing, and I think we should have gone. My only gripe is the starting point. We should have started at Karachi and gone north. AFG will never be solved until we deal with the PAKS.

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